Outline by Sections of Being and Time


Introduction

Chapter I

  1. The question of the meaning of Being needs to be restated clearly.

  2. The question must consider both the Being of entities that exist, and the Being of the inquirer asking the question. The entity which constitutes sentient inquiring individuals is Dasein, the ‘Being-there’ of persons.

  3. A primordial pre-scientific understanding of Being underlies all areas of inquiry: the clarification of the meaning of Being is the fundamental problem of all research. In particular, the sciences only collect facts to fill out the primordial structure. Ontological inquiry addresses Being itself; ontical inquiry is concerned with entities.

  4. Dasein is distinguished from all other entities by two features: its own Being is an issue for it, and a primordial understanding of Being has been disclosed to it. An analysis of Dasein’s Being will presumably lead to an Interpretation of the meaning of Being in general. The ontical level of Dasein’s existence is called existentiell, and the ontological level is existential.

Chapter II

  1. Time will be developed as the horizon for the understanding of Being, the limit within which understanding occurs, in concurrence with the development of temporality as the Being of Dasein. Dasein must also be exhibited in the usual state of everydayness.

  2. Traditional ontology, from the Greeks through Descartes to Kant, fails to ask the question of the meaning of Being, and so must be destroyed.

  3. The method of analysis will be phenomenology.

    1. The Greek word “phenomenon” denotes that which shows itself in itself, to be distinguished from a semblance or appearance which derives from the phenomenon.

    2. The Greek word “logos” signifies letting something be seen, primarily through discourse. Truth lies in clear sensory perception.

    3. Phenomenology thus means letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in itself. It is a method of interpretation (hermeneutical analysis), as opposed to a “science of” objects.

  4. Outline of the treatise. The first division of Part Two appears in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics; the third division of Part One, and the second and third divisions of Part Two essentially constitute The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.


Part One: Division One

Chapter I

  1. The ‘Essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence, so that its Being determines its traditional objectlike essence (existential analysis). Dasein has a sense of mineness out of which it chooses among the possibilities of existence: either authentic, or inauthentic average everydayness.

  2. The traditional words “body,” “soul,” “spirit,” “life,” “man” and “I” must be avoided in order to get a complete existential analysis of Dasein.

  3. The everydayness of Dasein is far from a primitive state.

Chapter II

  1. The Being of Dasein is characterized by the existential expression ‘Being-in,’ which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. Neither Being-in nor the derivative term ‘Being alongside’ should be interpreted according to the usual spatial meanings of the constituent words; instead, an understanding of these states leads to Dasein’s primordial spatiality. The Fact of Dasein’s existence as itself is its facticity.
              The Being of Dasein, and especially Being-in-the-world, are normally misinterpreted in terms of the Being of entities encountered within the world. This leads to the conception of ‘Objects’ separate from ‘subjects.’

  2. Knowing is a state of Being founded upon Being-in-the-world: Being-in makes knowing possible, and nullifies the traditional problem of knowledge. Dasein is always ‘outside’ alongside entities it encounters in the world (fundamental connection to the world), even in the process of knowing, and ‘inside’ as a Being-in-the-world which knows. The process of knowing entities present-at-hand begins by holding back concern with the world and achieving a mode of just tarrying alongside, so that entities may be encountered purely as they look.

Chapter III

  1. The ontological concept ‘worldhood’ represents a constitutive item of Being-in-the-world. The term ‘world’ signifies the sphere of interest wherein Dasein exists. Entities present-at-hand are not part of the world, but may be within-the-world; an explication of their Being does not give a full understanding of the world. The Being of entities encountered in the environment (everyday world of Dasein) will, however, be used as a preliminary theme.

  2. Entities encountered in concernful dealings in the environment form a totality of equipment, a structure of assignments and references. Their kind of Being is readiness-to-hand, which is taken as their ontological definition.

  3. Everyday Being-in-the-world is a circumspective absorption in the references and assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment.

  4. Formally, a sign is a ready-to-hand item of equipment which indicates the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. A sign is not a reference itself, but is ontologically founded upon reference.
              The equipmental character of a totality of items ready-to-hand may not always have been discovered in circumspection; these items should even then not be regarded as bare Thinghood, merely present-at-hand (although entities that are not within-the-world may be present-at-hand).

  5. The phenomenon of the world is the “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, and is that for which entities may be encountered in involvement, the character of Being of the ready-to-hand. The structure to which Dasein thus assigns itself is the worldhood of the world. The establishment of this structure of significations is a primordial act, prior to any act of understanding: Dasein necessarily has a primordial familiarity with the world. Through the structure of significations Dasein gives itself simultaneously its own Being and the potential for understanding a context of involvements by Being-in-the-world. Disclosure, and in particular language, are founded upon this set of significations.

  6. Descartes’ ontology of the world is based exclusively on the concept of extension.

  7. This ontology arises from a consideration of the ontical characteristic of substance, and so is inherently unclear.

  8. Being thus becomes equated with constant presence-at-hand. Mathematical knowledge is especially suited to securely grasp this sense of permanence.

  9. The term region signifies the place (not necessarily spatial) within the world to which equipment belongs.

  10. The spatiality of Dasein is characterized by deseverance and directionality. Desevering is a bringing-close in attention which can distinguish or differentiate; its subjectivity reveals the Reality of the world. Desevering creates regions in the world. Dasein does not wander about within its deseverances, but carries them with itself and may alter them. Directionality is an awareness of the significations which locate regions.

  11. Ordinary space arises from Dasein’s spatiality when the world loses its worldhood, its character of involvement, and is reduced to a collection of extended Things present-at-hand.

Chapter IV

  1. The sense of Self of Dasein is an existential state, not to be equated with the traditional constant “I.” An isolated “I” does not exist: Others are always there with Dasein in Being-in-the-world.

  2. This fundamental connection is Being-with; the Being of Others is Dasein-with. While attention to entities encountered within-the-world is called concern, attention to entities with the same kind of Being as Dasein (Others) is solicitude. Since the Being of Dasein is Being-with, Dasein’s primordial understanding of its own Being implies an understanding of Others. The relationship of Dasein to Dasein is constitutive for one’s own Dasein: the Others become a duplicate of the Self. This state is not a simple summation of ‘subjects.’

  3. In everyday Being-with, the Being of one’s own Dasein and the Being of Others get leveled down into an average, impersonal, public “they.” The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, to be distinguished from the authentic Self. The “they” is, however, an existentiale: Being-one’s-Self in the “they” is an essential state of Dasein.

Chapter V

  1. The analysis of the Being of Being-there is existential, an analysis of ways to be. A multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be equally constitutive, or equiprimordial; the ground need not be simple.

  2. An essential characteristic of Being-there is state-of-mind, or mood. In having a mood, Dasein is disclosed as the Being it is in existing: this unveiling is expressed as thrownness into its “there,” the facticity of its being delivered over. The mood discloses Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes possible circumspective concern. Openness to the world is the attunement of a state-of-mind; the world is only seen through and in accordance with moods.

  3. Fear is a state-of-mind characterized by uncertainty with regard to encounters in the world.

  4. Equiprimordial with state-of-mind is understanding: the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being which discloses of what its Being is capable. Understanding acts through projection upon the possibilities of Being. Understanding as projection constitutes Dasein’s sight, and simultaneously allows full disclosure of both the world and existence as such. The term transparency designates ‘knowledge of Self’ as this full disclosure of Being-in-the-world. ‘Intuition,’ ‘thinking’ and ‘knowing’ are all derived from understanding.

  5. The process of working out the projected possibilities of understanding, or making explicit the involvements of entities ready-to-hand, is interpretation. Any act of discovery is an interpretation of understanding, an unveiling of the fore-sight or fore-conception of understanding. Meaning as a concept is the framework articulated through interpretation. The fore-structure of understanding represents a logical circle which holds the possibility for the most primordial kind of knowing.

  6. Assertion is defined as a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and communicates. Assertion, as a statement about presence-at-hand, is a derivative mode of interpretation in which the totality of involvements or readiness-to-hand is covered up.

  7. Equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding is discourse or talk, through which the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world is expressed. Discourse is the ontological foundation of language. While Dasein-with is already essentially a co-state-of-mind and co-understanding, Being-with becomes explicitly shared in discourse.
              The elements of discourse are: that about which the discourse is; what is said-in-the-talk; the communication; and the making-known. These do not necessarily receive ‘verbal’ expression. For example, hearing is an existential possibility of discourse in which Dasein is open to Others and itself. Another possibility is reticence, a keeping silent, which is essential to clear authentic communication. The science of language needs to be reestablished on this ontology: current language, based on an ontology of the present-at-hand, is predominantly spatial in the ordinary sense.

  8. Since language is based on discourse, it preserves an understanding of the world disclosed to Dasein, and with it an understanding of Being. Everyday Dasein as the they-self, however, pays more attention to the talk itself than that about which the talk is. The resulting average communication, or idle talk, covers up and closes off the world and genuine understanding.

  9. Primordial and genuine truth is pure beholding; Dasein may achieve this state by circumspective concern which tarries alongside. Everyday Dasein, however, does not tarry, but becomes constantly distracted by new possibilities and never dwells anywhere. This mode of knowing just to know without ever understanding is curiosity.

  10. Idle talk and curiosity purport to consider everything, and in a genuine manner, but the goal is never reached; this generates an ambiguity in which genuineness becomes undecidable and all research becomes sterile.

  11. The state of everyday Dasein is a falling from an authentic potentiality for Being one’s Self into the inauthenticity of the they-self, guided by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Falling is an existentiale, an essential state of Dasein. Falling is a tranquilizing downward plunge into a false universal understanding of Dasein.

Chapter VI

  1. The Being of Dasein is a structural whole, and will be explicated ontologically in terms of the primordially unitary phenomenon of care.

  2. Anxiety is a state-of-mind of Dasein in which Being-in has been disclosed as a potentiality-for-Being; that is, Dasein is disclosed as Being-possible, as Being-free for choosing itself. That in the face of which one is anxious is Being-in-the-world: anxiety is a basic way of Being-in-the-world. Anxiety produces an uncanniness, a feeling of “not-Being-at-home.” The phenomenon of falling is a fleeing in the face of this “not-at-home” to the familiarity of everyday Dasein.

  3. The Being of Dasein may be stated in a formal ontological manner as Being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities or Others encountered within-the-world). This structural whole is designated by the term care. The “ahead-of-itself” represents Dasein’s self-projection upon its possibilities for Being.

  4. The interpretation of the Being of Dasein occurs in a pre-ontological way in ancient literature.

  5. The traditional problem of proving the existence of a Reality independent of consciousness arises from an interpretation of Being in terms of Things present-at-hand, so that Dasein too becomes something present-at-hand.

    1. The question becomes meaningless to Dasein as Being-in- the-world, to whom the world is disclosed along with its Being. Entities merely present-at-hand can only be discovered on the basis of a disclosed world. Knowing depends explicitly upon a connection to the external world: Kant implicitly presupposes this in his proof of Reality. The apparent need for such a proof comes from an incomplete definition of the Being of Dasein.

    2. Comparison with the work of Dilthey.

    3. Reality is thus grounded in, and explicitly dependent upon, the Being of Dasein and the understanding of Being it possesses. Reality is, however, to be distinguished from the Real: the nature of entities themselves in the absence of Dasein cannot even be considered.

  6. Being and truth are closely related.

    1. Truth is an uncovering in which an entity is seen as itself. The Being-true of an assertion is a Being-uncovering.

    2. Disclosedness, or uncovering, belongs essentially to Dasein as Being-in-the-world: Dasein is itself true and in the truth. Dasein as falling, however, may also be in untruth, where the world is seen in the mode of semblance. Dasein is equiprimordially in truth and untruth: the way of uncovering lies in distinguishing understandingly between the two.
                Since discourse also belongs essentially to Dasein, the uncoveredness of entities may be expressed or communicated in assertion; the Being of the uncoveredness is then ready-to-hand. If instead the assertion is taken as something present-at-hand, truth falls into a relationship (judgment) between things present-at-hand: this is the traditional definition of truth of Aristotle.

    3. Truth arises solely from the disclosedness of Dasein. Truth exists only as long as Dasein exists: all truth is relative to Dasein. The ideas of ‘eternal truths’ and ‘ideal subjects’ are residues of Christian theology.


Part One: Division Two

  1. The primordial ontological basis of Dasein’s existentiality will be explicated in terms of temporality. Note that any entity whose essence is existence is fundamentally opposed to grasping it as an entity which is a whole.

Chapter I

  1. This difficulty may be illustrated thus: Dasein as potentiality-for-Being never reaches ‘wholeness’ while it exists, and yet upon gaining its ‘wholeness’ in death seems to completely lose Being-in-the-world.

  2. The dying of one of the Others represents a transition from Dasein’s kind of Being to no-longer-Dasein, just present-at-hand (dying is to be distinguished from perishing, the going-out-of-the-world of that which merely has life). The death of the Other does not offer Dasein a full experience of the phenomenon. Death is a personal experience, and constitutive for Dasein’s totality.

  3. Since Dasein has the character of projection upon its possibilities, death is not a Being-at-an-end but a Being-towards-the-end. Dying is a way of Being towards death.

  4. An intermediate phenomenon occurs when Dasein ends without authentically dying, which is designated its demise and may be open to medical investigation. Death as the end of Dasein as Being-in-the-world does not imply any ontical decision about the possibility of another Being afterwards; only a full ontological conception of death can make this question meaningful.

  5. In death as the end of Being-in-the-world, all of Dasein’s relations to any other Dasein are undone. Death is that possibility which is non-relational, impending, one’s ownmost, and not to be outstripped. Thrownness into death is revealed by anxiety as the disclosedness of one’s uttermost possibility of existence, namely, nonexistence.

  6. Everyday Being-towards-death as falling is a fleeing in the face of death, but even in evasion and concealment this uttermost possibility is constantly an issue for Dasein.

  7. Truth varies in kind and certainty in accord with the uncovered entity in which it is grounded. Thus, death is certain in that it is inevitable, but being possible at any moment it is indefinite as to the actual time of occurrence.

  8. Being-towards-death is an anticipation of the uttermost possibility. Anticipation of this possibility discloses at once all of the possibilities which lie before it, so that anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance in an existentiell manner: that is, the possibility of an authentic existence as a whole potentiality-for-Being. Anticipation individualizes Dasein, freeing it from falling for the possibility of a self-understanding of its own totality in anxiety.

Chapter II

  1. If Dasein is to realize this possibility for authentic existence, it must first be made aware of the possibility: this is the purpose of the voice of conscience.

  2. Conscience is a call which brings Dasein back from lostness in the idle talk of the they-self, so that it may listen understandingly to its authentic Self.

  3. This call is not vocal: conscience discourses solely yet clearly in the mode of reticence.

  4. In conscience Dasein calls to itself from out of the uncanniness of anxiety: conscience is the call of care.

  5. The basis of Dasein’s Being arises from projection upon its possibilities. Dasein never exists before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Dasein never has power over its own basis: this type of Being is Being-a-basis. Dasein’s character of projection is also essentially a nullity in that Dasein may only choose one of its possibilities of existence at a time. Guilt is thus defined existentially as Being-the-basis of a nullity; Dasein as such is guilty. The call of conscience frees Dasein for its ownmost authentic potentiality of Being-guilty.
              All dialectic relies upon negation, and yet never gives a precise ontological definition of “notness”; the clarification can only come from the meaning of Being in general.

  6. Ordinary interpretations of conscience with all their attendant moral judgments are derivatives of the existential Interpretation of conscience as the call to Being-guilty.

  7. Resoluteness is a reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety. Resoluteness as authentic Being-one’s-Self is attested to by conscience. It is a determining of what is factically possible, a resolution of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being. The “there” disclosed in resoluteness is called the Situation.

Chapter III

  1. It is only in anticipation of death that resoluteness, as Dasein’s authentic truth, reaches its authentic certainty. Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in anticipatory resoluteness.

  2. The primordial truth of existence demands an equiprimordial Being-certain in which one maintains oneself in the disclosure of resoluteness. The certainty of the resolution signifies holding oneself free for the possibility of taking it back: authentic resoluteness resolves to keep repeating itself, holding itself free constantly. This constant certainty allows Dasein to anticipate the uttermost constant certainty of death, thereby achieving a certainty which is whole and authentic.

  3. Ontological Interpretation projects an entity presented to it upon the entity’s own Being in order to conceptualize its structure. Dasein as falling is usually ontologically farthest from itself, so that existential analysis has the character of doing violence to everyday interpretations.
              Investigation into existence has the same kind of Being as Dasein itself, and is logically circular. The idea of existence is first posited, not as an axiom from which further propositions are deduced, but as an understanding projection, so that the subsequent Intepretation of Dasein may decide of its own accord from internal consistency whether it has the Being for which it has been disclosed in projection. The circle of understanding arises from Dasein thus: (1) understanding is a basic state of Dasein’s Being; (2) Dasein’s Being is constituted as care. The circle is not to be avoided, but leapt into wholly and primordially as the only source of authentic truth in the understanding of Being.
              The distinction between existence and Reality can only be made explicit within the horizon of an idea of Being in general.

  4. Kant’s interpretation of the “I” as “subject” views it in the ontologically inappropriate manner of something always present-at-hand. In saying “I” Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Dasein has a Self-constancy in anticipatory resoluteness (as opposed to the non-Self-constancy of Being-fallen); the ontological structure of care thus includes Selfhood.

  5. Dasein as anticipatory resoluteness is authentically futural in that it is always coming towards itself in its potentiality-for-Being. At the same time, its projective character signifies being as it already was: Dasein is authentically “having been” in coming back by coming towards itself futurally. Futher, resoluteness discloses the Present along with the Situation. The unitary phenomenon of a future which makes present in the process of having been is designated temporality. The ordinary conception of time in terms of ‘future,’ ‘past’ and ‘present’ is a derivative of temporality.
              Temporality as a characteristic of Dasein makes anticipatory resoluteness possible: temporality is thus the meaning of authentic care, and reveals the primordial unity of the care-structure. Temporality is not an entity, but temporalizes itself in various ways to generate the modes of Dasein’s Being. The phenomena of the future, “having been,” and the Present are ecstases of temporality; the future is the primary phenomenon of temporality and the primary meaning of existentiality. Primordial temporality is finite.

  6. The earlier analysis of everydayness needs to be repeated in terms of temporality.

Chapter IV

  1. The ontological source of Dasein’s Being is not a simple, unique structural element: the simple and obvious are degenerations from the primordial multiplicity of phenomena.

  2. The modes of disclosedness will be Interpreted in terms of temporality.

    1. Understanding is primarily futural. Dasein ‘knows’ by maintaining itself in an existentiell possibility upon which it is projected; this is grounded in the authentic future by anticipation. To anticipatory resoluteness there belongs an authentic Present in which the resolution discloses the Situation: this is the moment of vision (which is not the same as the “now” of ordinary time). Authentic Being-as-having-been is repetition. The inauthentic understanding of falling Dasein may be characterized as an awaiting which makes present and forgets.

    2. State-of-mind temporalizes itself primarily in having-been. The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits and makes present. Anxiety brings one face to face with repeatability, revealing the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being (the future of resoluteness).
                There is no fear in resoluteness. Anxiety liberates from worthless possibilities and frees for authentic possibilities.

    3. Falling has its existential meaning in the Present. Curiosity is inauthentically futural in that it desires a possibility as something actual. Curiosity makes present without holding or tarrying; as the present leaps away, it is easily forgotten.
                The ordinary present arises from the authentic Present in falling.

    4. The structure of language derives from the temporality of discourse, which is primarily a making-present.

  3. Dasein is an entity which has been cleared; its “there” is cleared primordially by ecstatical temporality.

    1. In order to use a totality of equipment in involvement, the Self must first forget itself; equipment is then encountered by awaiting.

    2. An existential Interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of Being, and the connection between Being and truth, have clarified in terms of the temporality of existence. Circumspective deliberation makes explicit the involvement structure of ‘something as something,’ of which Dasein already has a primordial understanding.
                Theoretical discovery releases entities from their environmental confines by modifying one’s understanding of Being. In the case of physics, Nature is projected mathematically as a collection of entities merely present-at-hand. The experimentation which explores this ‘factual science’ is dependent upon an a priori projection of the state of Being of entites: there are in principle no ‘bare facts.’ A full explication of the initial understanding of Being and the methods subsequently employed will reveal a complete existential conception of a science.
                The totality of projection underlying theoretical discovery is thematizing. It consists of an Articulation of the understanding of Being, a delimitation of the area of subject-matter, and a way of conceiving which is appropriate to the entities studied.

    3. Dasein is its world in existence: if no Dasein exists there is no world. The world is always disclosed along with Dasein’s Being; Dasein’s freedom in discovery consists in moving about within the limitations of the world. The condition for the possibility of the world lies in the horizonal schema of temporality: the horizon of the future is represented by the phrase “for-the-sake-of-itself,” that of the character of having-been by “in the face of which” and “in which,” and that of the Present by “in-order-to.” In understanding Dasein comes back from these horizons to encounter entities within-the-world.
                The world as conceived in this way is certainly subjective, but this subjective world is more objective than any possible Object.

  4. Dasein’s spatiality is grounded in temporality. Dasein is not spatial in the sense of an extended corporeal Thing with boundaries: rather, it literally takes in space. The ordinary conception of space arises from the falling state of Dasein, in such a way that Dasein’s everyday interpretation of itself and its language are dominated by ‘spatial representations.’

  5. Everydayness is a mode of existence, and may be overcome in the moment of vision.

Chapter V

  1. Birth and death are both ends of Dasein’s totality. Factical Dasein exists as born, and as such is already dying as Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein exists, both of the limits of existence and everything in between exist at once in unity. The movement in which Dasein stretches itself along this unity is historizing; the corresponding ontological structure is historicality. Dasein can only exist historically because it is temporal.

  2. The ordinary conception of history is a historizing of Dasein which comes to pass in time, and as past Being-with- one-another has been handed down to us and is continuingly effective.

  3. In anticipation of death Dasein grasps the finitude of its existence and brings itself into its fate: the finitude of temporality is the basis of Dasein’s historicality. In resoluteness Dasein comes back to itself and hands itself down by the repetition of a possibility of existence. This explicit handing down (inheriting) by repeating is fate. The kind of historizing which lies in anticipatory resoluteness is Dasein’s authentic historicality.

  4. History is grounded in Dasein’s historicality, so that the historizing of history is a historizing of Being-in-the-world. Entities within-the-world are thus already incorporated into history, and are called the world-historical. In the inauthentic historicality of falling Dasein the world-historical are taken as Things present-at-hand, and history becomes a sequence of disconnected Experiences also present-at-hand. The unity of history is only accessible in the constancy of resoluteness of existence.

  5. The historiological disclosure of history has its roots in Dasein’s historicality, and as such is objective.
              The objectivity of any science is determined by the extent to which it can bring the entity which it takes as its theme, uncovered in the primordiality of its Being, to our understanding.

  6. Connections to the work of Dilthey and Count Yorck.

Chapter VI

  1. The ordinary conception of time will be analyzed in terms of temporality as primordial time.

  2. Temporality is constitutive for the clearedness of the “there,” so that temporality is always primordially interpretable in the “there” and familiar to us. This is the source of datability, the relational structure of the concepts ‘now,’ ‘then’ amd ‘on the former occasion.’ These designations, along with the ‘during’ which connects them, all have a length or span. In the disclosure of the “there” time is allotted to Dasein, and may be manipulated by Dasein’s state of existence; for example, time is lost in the irresoluteness of inauthentic existence.

  3. Entities that do not have the character of Dasein are within-time. In the temporalizing of temporality a measurable public time is disclosed within which everyone assigns himself time; it is designated world-time because it belongs to the world. The measurement of time is essentially a making-present of a multiplicity of “nows.”
              World-time is subjective, as it first makes possible the Being of the factically existing Self; it is also more objective than any Object because with the disclosedness of the world it becomes the condition for the possibility of entities within-the-world.

  4. Ordinary time is that which is counted in following the traveling pointer of a clock: it is a sequence or flow of “nows” (now-time). These “nows” lack the datability and significance characteristic of world-time; they are treated as co-present-at-hand with entities encountered. With no distinctions between the various “nows,” time may be taken as continuous and infinite. World-time gets leveled off by falling Dasein to produce ordinary time: the latter is irreversible because temporality, as the source of world-time, is temporalized primarily futurally (by contrast temporality is accessible in the reverse direction).

  5. Comparison with Hegel’s (a) conception of time as intuited becoming (essentially a sequence of “nows” like ordinary time), and (b) connection between time and spirit, where both are taken as negations of a negation.

  6. Is time the horizon of Being?